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Abstract. Nowadays, huge amount of documents are increasingly trans-
ferred to the remote servers due to the appealing features of cloud com-
puting. On the other hand, privacy and security of the sensitive informa-
tion in untrusted cloud environment is a big concern. To alleviate such
concerns, encryption of sensitive data before its transfer to the cloud has
become an important risk mitigation option. Encrypted storage provides
protection at the expense of a significant increase in the data manage-
ment complexity. For effective management, it is critical to provide effi-
cient selective document retrieval capability on the encrypted collection.
In fact, considerable amount of searchable symmetric encryption schemes
have been designed in the literature to achieve this task. However, with
the emergence of big data everywhere, available approaches are insuffi-
cient to address some crucial real-world problems such as scalability.
In this study, we focus on practical aspects of a secure keyword search
mechanism over encrypted data on a real cloud infrastructure. First, we
propose a provably secure distributed index along with a parallelizable
retrieval technique that can easily scale to big data. Second, we integrate
authorization into the search scheme to limit the information leakage
in multi-user setting where users are allowed to access only particular
documents. Third, we offer efficient updates on the distributed secure
index. In addition, we conduct extensive empirical analysis on a real
dataset to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed practical techniques.
1 Introduction
In recent years, advances in cloud computing has led to a rapid transition in
information systems. Cloud services remove the burden of large scale data man-
agement in a cost-effective manner. Hence, it is quite common for individuals
and organizations to outsource their documents. At the same time, storage of
sensitive information in untrusted cloud environment raises serious privacy con-
cerns. To resolve such concerns, one approach is to transfer documents in their
encrypted form. Encrypted storage protects sensitive information at the expense
of a significant reduction in the data computation capability. Among potential
computations on the remote encrypted collection, selective retrieval is highly im-
portant for many mission critical tasks. In fact, a substantial amount of research
effort has been invested to enable efficient execution of this operation.
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes are the most common tools
for searchable and secure cloud storage [?,?,?,?,?]. Available SSE schemes en-
able selective document retrieval over encrypted collection. However, they do
not address some practical problems of real systems such as scalability since
they are mainly designed to run on a single server. With the emergence of big
data everywhere, scalability becomes a fundamental requirement for cloud sys-
tems. Fortunately, this challenge is resolved by an effective design principle that
enforces distribution of both data and computation to multiple commodity hard-
wares. In fact, old storage systems are increasingly replaced with the ones that
suits well to this distributed paradigm such as BigTable [?] and HBase [?]. Ac-
cordingly, it is critical to design a SSE scheme that can easily be distributed
to many machines to handle very large amounts of documents. Another impor-
tant practical aspect is to consider the access rights of distinct users during the
retrieval. Data owners generally share limited amount of documents with other
users. To prevent excessive information leakage to the remote servers, integration
of authorization into the search scheme is crucial.
In this study, we propose a distributed secure index along with a parallelizable
search mechanism. Specifically, we generate an inverted index on the document
corpus which is subject to padding and secure encryption before its transfer to
the cloud. This encrypted index is further vertically partitioned among multiple
servers to enable simultaneous decryption of large index payloads during the
search process. To our knowledge, this is the first effort in designing provably
secure, distributed SSE scheme that can easily scale to big data. We also integrate
authorization into the search to restrict the information leakage of the scheme
according to user access rights. Finally, we propose a secure update mechanism
on the distributed index which is a necessary functionality for practical cloud
storage systems. In summary, there are several notable contributions of this
study:
Distributed SSE Scheme: Current cloud infrastructures consist of many
machines. To utilize their computational power to handle big data, we propose
a secure index structure on top of a distributed key-value store known as HBase
[?]. Proposed approach is highly scalable. Our empirical evaluations indicate
that search operation can be performed less than a second for approximately
1,200,000 documents on an HBase cluster of twelve machines.
Authorization-Aware Secure Keyword Search: Almost all practical
SSE schemes selectively leak information to the remote servers for efficiency.
Although the leaked information varies among protocols, access pattern leakage
is common. That is, untrusted server learns identifiers of the documents that are
in the result set of an issued query without observing their contents. To restrict
this leakage in multi-user setting, proposed scheme reveals only identifiers of the
documents on which the user is authorized.
Secure Update on the Distributed Index: Real document storage sys-
tems are highly dynamic. Some new documents are produced in time while some
documents become outdated. To reflect these changes, we propose an effective
update mechanism on the distributed index.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review related work in
Section 2. We present distributed secure search scheme and its update mechanism
in Section 3 and Section 4 respectively. Then, in Section 5, we analyze the security
of the scheme. Finally, we report our experimental analysis in Section 6 and
conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Over the years, various protocols and security definitions have been proposed
for searchable symmetric encryption (SSE). Optimal security is achieved by the
ORAM model [?] of Goldreich et al. which does not leak any information. How-
ever, this model is impractical due to the excessive computational costs. Even
the more efficient versions of ORAM [?,?,?] are not practical enough to scale
well for big data, especially in a multi-user setting.
As an alternative to ORAM, there are approaches ([?,?,?,?,?,?]) which se-
lectively leak information (e.g., access pattern) for more practical SSE schemes.
The first of such approaches was provided in [?]. Later on, Goh et al. proposed a
security definition to formalize the security requirements of SSE in [?]. Similarly,
Chang et al. introduced a slightly stronger definition in [?]. However, both def-
initions do not consider adaptive adversaries which could generate the queries
according to the outcomes of previous queries. The shortcomings of [?] and [?]
have been addressed in [?], where Curtmola et al. presented adaptive semantic
security definition for SSE schemes.
The most computationally efficient SSE schemes that are compatible with
the adaptive semantic security definition are presented in [?], [?] and [?]. In [?],
inverted bit vector indices are generated for each unique keyword. Then bit vec-
tors are masked with a secure encryption scheme. These encrypted vectors can
be stored and processed in our distributed framework. However, the construc-
tion of [?] requires interaction with the user during the search process and its
pure bit vector index structure is not efficient in terms of storage. To enable a
single-round search through a more compact index along with an update mecha-
nism, dynamic SSE scheme was proposed in [?]. The approach of [?] is based on
a linked list structure. Specifically, for each keyword wi, identifiers of the docu-
ments that contain wi are randomly distributed to the cells of an array. Then,
these cells are linked to each other with pointers. Finally, both pointers and cell
contents are encrypted with a secure encryption scheme. Search mechanism of
this construction necessitates sequential tracing on the encrypted list which hin-
ders parallelizable search. To resolve the sequential tracing problem, a scheme
that is based on red-black trees is proposed in [?]. In this construction, multiple-
processors could apply decryption on distinct branches of the tree during the
search but the whole tree resides in a single machine which is not compatible
with the big data design principles. This tree keeps a leaf node for each document
that consists of m-bit vector where m is the number of keywords in the corpus
along with internal nodes that also consists of m-bit vectors. Hence, if millions of
keywords exist in a very large document corpus, single machine, multi-processor
setting will not be sufficient. In [?], a SSE scheme with support for conjunctive
queries was proposed. Although this scheme could be parallelized in theory, it
does not provide an update mechanism on the index which is fundamental for
real world applications. Also, these SSE schemes leak access pattern without
considering access-rights of distinct users.
3 Secure Keyword Search
In this part, we present our secure keyword search scheme that is based on a
distributed index structure. In Section 3.1, we describe the index construction
mechanism. Then, in Section 3.2, we focus on the search that is built on top
of the index. Finally, in Section 3.3, we provide an extension on the scheme for
authorization integration.
3.1 Secure Index Construction
The proposed secure index is formed in three main phases:
1. Plain Index Generation: In this phase, each keyword is associated with
a set of documents. Specifically, suppose {D1, ..., Dn} is a set of documents with
contents {W (D1), ..., W (Dn)}, id(Dj) is the identifier of Dj and {w1, ..., wz}
represents the set of keywords. Then an inverted index {(w1, Lw1), ..., (wz , Lwz)}
is formed such that id(Dj) ∈ Lwi if and only if wi ∈ W (Dj).
After inverted index construction, a plain payload is generated for each key-
word in the form of a bit vector or a list. Payload type of a keyword is identified
according to its frequency in the corpus with the goal of minimizing total storage
cost. Here, both payload types should have a fixed size to hide keyword frequency.
In fact, each bit vector consists of n bits where n represents the number of docu-
ments in the corpus. Similarly, each list consists of Υ document identifiers where
Υ is a constant. During the construction, if the frequency of a keyword is more
than Υ , its payload is represented as a bit vector. Otherwise, it is represented
as a list. In this setting, suppose ∆ = {f1, f2, ..., fz} represents the expected
frequency distribution of the keywords, |id| is the bit length of any identifier and
I(.) is an indicator function. Then expected storage cost denoted as E(Υ,∆, n)
can be computed as follows:
E(Υ,∆, n) =
z∑
i=1
I(fi > Υ ) · n+ (1− I(fi > Υ )) · Υ · |id| (1)
To identify optimal Υ for minimal storage cost without leaking any infor-
mation, we utilize Zipf’s law [?] which states that frequency of any keyword is
inversely proportional to its frequency based rank in a natural language corpus.
In our construction, payloads of top-t ranked keywords are put into bit vector
form and the remaining ones are represented as a padded list as depicted in
Figure 1.
More formally, suppose H(N) represents N th harmonic number, p(x; 1, N)
represents the Zipfian distribution with exponent 1 such that p(x) = x−1 ·
Fig. 1. Payload Type Selection
H(N)−1 and z is the number of keywords in the corpus. Then a padded list
will have Υ = ⌈p(t) ·n⌉ members and the expected storage cost can be computed
as follows:
E(Υ, p, n) = t · n+ (z − t) · p(t) · n · |id| (2)
Theorem 31 Optimal member size for a padded list denoted as Υ with respect
to the expected storage cost E(Υ, p, n) is ⌈(|id| ·H(z) · z)−0.5 · n⌉.
Proof. argmint E(Υ, p, n)⇒
dE(Υ,p,n)
dt
= d
dt
[t · n + (z − t) · t−1 ·H(z)−1 · n · |id|] = 0
argmint E(Υ, p, n) =
√
|id| · z
H(z)
Υ = ⌈p(argmint E(Υ, p, n)) · n⌉ = ⌈(|id| ·H(z) · z)
−0.5 · n⌉
Note that Υ is identified using public distribution. Hence it does not leak any
information regarding the dataset. Once Υ is identified, a plain payload Pwi is
generated for each keyword wi. Specifically, suppose {(w1, Lw1), ..., (wz , Lwz)}
is an inverted index where Lwi is a list of identifiers for the documents that
contain wi. Here, each identifier is an integer from 1 to n where n is the number
of the documents in the corpus. Then Pwi is in the form of an n-bit vector if
|Lwi | > Υ such that Pwi [j] = 1 for each j ∈ Lwi and Pwi [j] = 0 otherwise.
If |Lwi | ≤ Υ , Pwi is in the form a list such that Pwi is generated by inserting
Υ − |Lwi | fake identifiers (i.e., id = 0) to the original list Lwi .
2. Index Encryption: Plain index construction step results in an inverted
index with fixed size bit vector or list payloads. In this step, this index is sub-
ject to encryption. Specifically, suppose {(w1, Pw1), ..., (wz , Pwz )} is a plain
index, ΦKt and ΨKp are pseudo-random functions with secret keys Kt and Kp,
OS : {0, 1}
κ × {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}κ is a random oracle1. Then encrypted index
{(Ew(w1), Ep(Pw1)), ..., (Ew(wz), Ep(Pwz ))} is generated as follows:
– Generate Ew(wi) such that Ew(wi) = ΦKt(wi).
1 Cryptographic keyed hash functions such as HMAC-SHA256 could be utilized as a
random oracle [?].
– Generate a random oracle key K(wi) for the encryption of payload Pwi such
that K(wi) = ΨKp(wi).
– Construct payload encryption blocks.
1) Suppose Pwi is an n-bit vector and κ is the output length of the random
oracle. Then divide Pwi into κ bit blocks B
1
wi
, ..., Bℓwi such that ℓ = ⌈n/κ⌉ and
Bjwi = Pwi [(j − 1) · κ + 1] ... Pwi [(j − 1) · κ+ κ]. Here, Pwi [k] is the k
th bit of
Pwi for 1 ≤ k ≤ n and zero otherwise.
2) Suppose Pwi is a list of identifiers with Υ elements such that Pwi = {idwi(1),
..., idwi(Υ )}, |id| is the bit length of the identifiers and κ is the output length
of the random oracle. Then each encryption block can host cp = ⌊κ / |id|⌋
identifiers. Accordingly, divide Υ members into blocks B1wi , ..., B
ι
wi
such that
ι = ⌈Υ/cp⌉ and Bjwi = idwi((j−1) ·cp+1) ... idwi((j−1) ·cp+cp). Here, idwi(k)
is the kth identifier in Pwi for 1 ≤ k ≤ Υ and zero otherwise.
– Suppose K(wi) is the random oracle key, B
1
wi
, ..., Brwi are the encryption blocks
for Pwi , OS(K(wi), j) denotes the output of random oracle OS with key K(wi)
when it is applied on input j and ⊕ represents the xor operator. Then generate
encryption of Pwi denoted as Ep(Pwi) as follows
2:
Ep(Pwi) = {piwi [1], ..., piwi [r]} (3)
piwi [j] = (B
j
wi
⊕ OS(K(wi), j), j) (4)
3. Index Partitioning: After the construction of encrypted index, it is
transferred to the cloud. In cloud environment, encrypted index is split among
multiple servers to parallelize the decryption of large index payloads during the
keyword search phase. Specifically, encrypted payloads are divided into multiple
regions which are further distributed to the region servers as depicted in Figure
2.
Fig. 2. Index Partitioning
In this study, we utilize the features of a distributed key-value store known
as HBase [?] for index partitioning. In HBase, key-value pairs can be split into
distinct regions according to their keys. To construct such regions, region bound
2 This encryption construct is derived from the random oracle based searchable en-
cryption construction of [?].
keys R1, R2, ..., Rm are generated such that R1 < R2 < ... < Rm. After bound
initialization, key-value pairs are mapped to the regions according to relative
position of their keys with respect to these bounds. Specifically, suppose (ki, vi)
is a pair that will be hosted in the store. Then it is placed into the jth region
provided that Rj ≤ ki < Rj+1. To form partitions on encrypted index
{(Ew(w1), Ep(Pw1)), ..., (Ew(wz), Ep(Pwz ))}, we convert it into key-value pairs
and map them into m distinct regions as follows:
– Suppose α is the bit length for the encrypted keywords such that α = |Ew(wi)|,
m is the number of regions, 0α represents a bit string of α zeros and || is
concatenation operator. Then generate region bound keys R1 = 1||0
α, R2 =
2||0α, ..., Rm = m||0
α.
– Suppose (Ew(wi), Ep(Pwi)) is an encrypted keyword, payload pair whereEp(Pwi)
consists of r encrypted blocks such that Ep(Pwi) = {πwi [1], πwi [2], ..., πwi [r]}.
Thenm key-value pairs are constructed on (Ew(wi), Ep(Pwi)). Specifically, 1||Ew(wi),
2||Ew(wi), ..., m||Ew(wi) are the keys and value for key j||Ew(wi) is an en-
crypted block set {πwi [j], πwi [j+m], ..., πwi [j+m · ⌊r/m⌋]}. Here, πwi [k] is the
kth block of Ep(Pi) for 1 ≤ k ≤ r and empty otherwise.
– Each key-value pair (j||Ew(wi), {πwi [j], πwi [j +m], ..., πwi [j +m · ⌊r/m⌋]}) is
stored in HBase. Value for row-key j||Ew(wi) is distributed to ⌈r/m⌉ distinct
columns. In this setting, pair with key j||Ew(wi) is stored in the j
th region
by the construction. This is because j||Ew(wi) lies between region bound keys
Rj = j||0
α and Rj+1 = (j + 1)||0
α.
3.2 Secure Search Mechanism
Once secure index is constructed and distributed to the cloud region servers,
data users can perform search on them with the help of the secrets they own.
During this setup, data owner also transfers the encrypted document collection
into the cloud along with the index. In this setting, encrypted collection denoted
as {C1, ..., Cn} is obtained by applying secure encryption (e.g., AES in CTR
mode of operation [?]) on the document collection. Suppose EncKcoll represents
the secure encryption with keyKcoll and Di is the i
th document in the collection.
Then Ci = EncKcoll(Di). After the transfer of encrypted collection, it is stored
in the distributed file system of the cloud service provider.
High-level overview of the search process is depicted in Figure 3. Initially
user generates a trapdoor for the keyword that he/she is interested in. Then
he/she sends it to the cloud master server which directs it to the region servers.
Each region server extracts the document identifiers for the issued trapdoor from
the partial indices they have and send them back to the master. Finally, master
combines the partial results and transfer the encrypted documents that are in
the final result set to the user.
Proposed search mechanism is in the form of well-known Map-Reduce pro-
gramming model [?] where region servers act as mappers and master server
acts as a reducer. Here, map function extracts plain document identifiers from
encrypted payload blocks with the help of the issued trapdoor. Then, reduce
Fig. 3. Search Mechanism
function combines the partial document identifier lists received from the map-
pers to finalize the search operation. Search process is performed in three main
steps.
1) Trapdoor Generation: Trapdoor for retrieving documents that contain
keyword wi denoted as Twi is formed using secret keys Kt and Kp. Specifically,
let ΦKt and ΨKp be pseudo-random functions with secret keys Kt and Kp. Then
Twi = (Ew(wi), K(wi)) such that Ew(wi) = ΦKt(wi) and K(wi) = ΨKp(wi).
Once Twi is formed, it is sent to the cloud master server by the user.
2) Region Search: Upon reception of Twi = (Ew(wi), K(wi)), master di-
rects it to the region servers to find the identifiers of the documents that con-
tain wi. Then the server that hosts j
th region generates row-key j||Ew(wi). If
(j||Ew(wi),{πwi [j], πwi [j+m], ..., πwi [j+m · ⌊r/m⌋]}) is a member of key-value
store, server applies decryption on the encrypted payload blocks. In this setting,
each block πwi [k] is in the form of (B
k
wi
⊕ OS(K(wi), k), k) by the construction
where OS is a random oracle and B
k
wi
represents the kth plain payload block for
wi. To obtain B
k
wi
, server performs decryption using K(wi) as follows:
B
k
wi
= (Bkwi ⊕ OS(K(wi), k)) ⊕ OS(K(wi), k)
After decryption, server extracts document identifiers from each block Bkwi .
Note that, each plain block is in the form of a bit vector or a list. If a block
is in the bit vector form, identifiers are obtained from the bit locations with
value one. If the block is in the list form, identifiers are obtained by decoding
the encoded integers in it. Here, some decoded integers represent fake identifiers
(i.e., id = 0) and they are eliminated by the region server at this phase. Once
document identifiers are extracted for the issued trapdoor, region server forms
identifier list for the jth region denoted as docwi(j) and transfers it to the master.
3) Document Transfer: In this step, master receives partial search re-
sults from each region server and merges them to finalize the search. Suppose,
docwi represents the identifiers of the encrypted documents that contain wi and
docwi(j) is the partial identifier list that is received from the j
th region. Then
docwi = docwi(1) ∪ ... ∪ docwi(m). Finally encrypted documents, identifiers
of which are included in docwi , are sent back to the user.
3.3 Authorization-Aware Keyword Search
Almost all efficient searchable symmetric encryption schemes leak some informa-
tion for efficiency. Although this leakage varies among schemes, access pattern
leakage is common. That is, untrusted server learns which documents are in-
cluded in the result set of an issued trapdoor without observing their contents.
More formally, suppose D[qi] represents the identifiers of the documents that are
in the result set of query qi. Then access pattern for qi denoted as Ap(qi) is a set
such that Ap(qi) = D[qi]. Unfortunately, access pattern leakage may subject to
some adversarial analysis [?] and it is critical to restrict it in an efficient way 3.
In real-world data sharing, it is highly likely that data owner shares only
subset of documents with other users through an authorization mechanism. Ac-
cordingly, if a data user issues a query qi, he/she may have access to only some
of the documents, identifiers of which are included in Ap(qi). However, available
schemes do not consider access rights of the users and leak Ap(qi) as it is dur-
ing the search. To prevent excessive leakage in multi-user setting, we propose
to integrate authorization into the process. Specifically, proposed scheme allows
only the leakage of identifiers in Ap(qi) on which the user who issued the query
is authorized.
In the context of this study, we form a secure search scheme with basic
authorization as a first step toward search schemes with more sophisticated
authorization techniques. Specifically, we utilize traditional file system access
control lists (ACLs) [?]. In ACLs, each file is included in a single access group
and each user is assigned to multiple groups. Then, users are allowed to access
only the files in their respective groups. More formally, suppose documents in the
collectionD = {D1, ..., Dn} are mapped to a group from the set G = {G1, ..., Gp}
with function g : D 7→ G. Similarly, user Ui is assigned to a set of groups denoted
as G(Ui) such that G(Ui) ⊆ G. Then Ui has access to document with identifier
id(Dj) if and only if g(id(Dj)) ∈ G(Ui). Here, suppose Ap(qj) denotes the
identifiers of the documents that are in the result set of query qj and D(Gi)
represents the identifiers of the documents that are in group Gi. Then restricted
access pattern for qj and group Gi denoted as Ap(qj , Gi) is a set such that
Ap(qj , Gi) = Ap(qj) ∩ D(Gi).
The main objective of authorization-aware keyword search is to restrict the
access leakage according to the user access rights. Specifically, suppose Uk issues
a query qi and G(Uk) denotes the groups that involves Uk. Then proposed scheme
leaks only Ap(qi, Gι) for each Gι ∈ G(Uk) instead of Ap(qi). To achieve this goal,
we extend both secure index generation and search scheme of Sections 3.1 and
3.2.
1) Authorization-Aware Secure Index Construction: In the basic in-
dex construction of Section 3.1, each keyword wi is associated with encryption
blocks B1wi , ..., B
r
wi
, each of which contains the identifiers of the documents that
include wi. Then, these blocks are encrypted with the help of secret payload
3 Although access pattern leakage can be eliminated completely with oblivious RAM,
it is not practical enough to scale well for big data especially in multi-user setting.
key Kp. In the extended version, we utilize multiple secret keys. Specifically, we
generate group keys KG1 , ..., KGp and owner key Ko. The main goal of this
design is to encrypt each document identifier with the key of its group. By this
way, only the users that hold the corresponding group keys could generate a
valid trapdoor for their decryption during the search phase. Here, owner key is
formed for superusers such as data owner who access all the data to improve
their search efficiency. After key generation, blocks are encrypted as follows:
– IfBjwi is a list block, it consists of concatenated document identifiers id1||id2...||idz .
Here, suppose g(idx) is the group of document with identifier idx, KGi is the
secret key for group Gi, ΨKGi is a pseudo-random function with key KGi ,
K(wi, g(idx)) denotes random oracle key for pair (wi, g(idx)), |id| is the bit
length of an identifier and e(V, ι, υ) is a function that extracts the block of bits
between indices ι and υ from bit vector V . Then encryption of Bjwi denoted as
πjwi is formed as follows:
K(wi, g(idx)) = ΨKg(idx)(wi)
pi
j
wi
= (id1 ⊕ e(OS(K(wi, g(id1)), j), 1, |id|) || ...
|| idz ⊕ e(OS(K(wi, g(idz)), j), (z − 1) · |id|+ 1, z · |id|), j)
– If Bjwi is a bit vector of length k, it consists of bits each of which represent a
document identifier denoted as idj,1, idj,2, ..., idj,k respectively. Here, suppose
G(Bjwi) is the set of groups for the identifiers in block B
j
wi
such that G(Bjwi) =
g(idj,1) ∪ ... ∪ g(idj,k) where g(idj,ρ) represents the group of document with
identifier idj,ρ. Then bit vector is initially encrypted with each group key KGι
where Gι ∈ G(B
j
wi
) to form encrypted bit vector πjwi(Gι):
K(wi, Gι) = ΨKGι (wi)
pi
j
wi
(Gι) = B
j
wi
⊕ O(K(wi, Gι), j)
Once encrypted bit vector is generated for each group in G(Bjwi), final encrypted
bit vector denoted as πjwi is formed by group oriented bit selection. Specifically,
suppose idj,1, ..., idj,k are the identifiers that is represented by bits 1, ..., k.
Then ρth bit of πjwi is set to ρ
th bit of πjwi(g(idj,ρ)) where g(idj,ρ) is the group
of document with identifier idj,ρ.
After group encryptions, we also apply encryption with key Ko on the blocks
to speed-up the search for owner queries. Here, encryption of a block Bjwi denoted
as φjwi is performed in the same way as the block encryption of the basic index
construction:
K(wi) = ΨKo(wi)
φ
j
wi
= Bjwi ⊕ O(K(wi), j)
In this setting, (πjwi , φ
j
wi
, j) constitutes the final encryption for block Bjwi .
Apart from the distinction in payload block encryption, authorization-aware se-
cure index construction is same as the basic secure index construction of Section
3.1. For authorization-aware construction, documents in the collection are also
encrypted according to their groups. Specifically, suppose KCGι is a secret col-
lection key for group Gι, g(id(Di)) denotes the group of Di, EncK is a secure
encryption scheme with key K and Ci is the encrypted form of Di. Then Ci =
EncKC
g(id(Di))
(Di).
2) Authorization-Aware Search Mechanism:
Authorization-aware search is an extension of the search mechanism that is
presented in Section 3.2. This extension integrates user-access rights into the
search. For protocol execution, data owner shares secure index and group func-
tion g : D 7→ G which maps document identifiers to access groups with cloud
service provider. Service provider will further use this group information dur-
ing the search to identify correct result-set against user trapdoors. Then owner
shares keyword encryption key Kt, group keys KGj , K
C
Gj
for Gj ∈ G(Uk) with
user Uk. Here, G(Uk) represents the groups that involves user Uk. Once neces-
sary information is shared with the participants, trapdoor generation and region
search on the cloud are performed as follows:
1) Trapdoor Generation: Trapdoor for retrieving documents that con-
tain keyword wi denoted as Twi is formed with secret keys Kt and KGj for
each Gj ∈ G(Uk) = {Gk,1, ..., Gk,f}. Specifically, let ΦKt and ΨK be pseudo-
random functions with secret keys Kt and K. Then Twi = (Ew(wi), {[Gk,1,
K(wi, Gk,1)], ..., [Gk,f ,K(wi, Gk,f )]}) where Ew(wi) = ΦKt(wi) andK(wi, Gk,j)
= ΨKGk,j (wi). Once Twi is formed, it is sent to the cloud master server by the
user.
2) Region Search: Upon reception of Twi = (Ew(wi), {[Gk,1,K(wi, Gk,1)],
..., [Gk,f ,K(wi, Gk,f )]}), master directs it to the region servers. Then each server
locates the encrypted blocks using Ew(wi) as in the basic search scheme. Once
they are located, decryption is applied. In this setting, each block consists of
user and owner components πjwi and φ
j
wi
. Server decrypts πjwi for user trapdoors
as follows:
– If πjwi is a list block, it consists of concatenated encrypted document identifiers
ωidj,1 ||ωidj,2 ...||ωidj,z . In this setting, suppose e(V, ι, υ) is a function that extracts
the block of bits between indices ι and υ from bit vector V and |id| is the bit
length of an identifier. Then, for each oracle key K(wi, Gk,ι) in Twi , server
performs the following operation:
id
∗
j,ρ = ωidj,ρ ⊕ e(OS(K(wi, Gk,ι), j), (ρ− 1) · |id|+ 1, ρ · |id|)
Note that, legitimate document identifiers are integers between 1 and n and
g(idj,ρ) represents the group of the document with identifier idj,ρ. In this setting,
if 1 ≤ id∗j,ρ ≤ n and g(id
∗
j,ρ) = Gk,ι, then id
∗
j,ρ is included in the search result
set. Otherwise it is discarded by the server. It is clear that equality of g(idj,ρ)
and Gk,ι implies the equality of id
∗
j,ρ and idj,ρ. On the other hand, decryption
with a wrong group key will result in a random value.
– If πjwi is a bit vector block of length k, it consists of encrypted bits each of
which represent document identifiers idj,1, ..., idj,k. Here, suppose G(B
j
wi
) is
the set of groups for this block such that G(Bjwi) = g(idj,1) ∪ ... ∪ g(idj,k)
and G(Uk) is the set of groups that involves user Uk who issued the trap-
door. Then bit vector is initially decrypted with each oracle key K(wi, Gk,ι) for
Gk,ι ∈ (G(B
j
wi
) ∩ G(Uk)):
V
j
wi
(Gk,ι) = pi
j
wi
⊕ O(K(wi, Gk,ι), j)
Once bit vector is decrypted for each group in G(Bjwi) ∩ G(Uk), final vector
denoted as V jwi is formed by group oriented bit selection. Specifically, suppose
idj,1, ..., idj,k are the identifiers that are represented by bits 1, ..., k. Then ρ
th
bit of V jwi is set to ρ
th bit of V jwi(g(idj,ρ)) if g(idj,ρ) ∈ G(Uk) and set to zero
otherwise. Finally, if ρth bit of V jwi is one, idj,ρ is included in the search result.
Note that, correct decryption of each bit can only be obtained with correct
group key. Otherwise, decrypted bit will be random.
After region servers identify document identifiers in their payloads, they
transfer them to the master. Master merges the partial lists and sends the corre-
sponding encrypted documents along with their groups to the user. In this set-
ting, suppose (Ci, Gι) is included in the result set. Then user decrypts Ci with
secret collection key KCGι to obtain its plain version. To speed-up the search for
owner queries, encrypted blocks of authorization-aware secure index also con-
tains owner blocks denoted as φjwi . This enables the execution of basic scheme
presented in Section 3.2 as it is.
4 Secure Index Update
Real document storage systems are highly dynamic in their nature. Accordingly,
data owner should be able to modify the encrypted collection that is hosted in
the cloud. To achieve this goal, we extend our protocol and index structure to
enable document deletion and addition.
4.1 Document Deletion
Removal of a document from the cloud storage necessitates the elimination of
the references against it that are included in the search index. To keep track of
these references, we construct an update index. This new index stores the cell
addresses of the search index that are connected to a particular document and
it is generated through three steps.
1. Plain Index Construction: During the search index setup, encryption
blocks are constructed for each keyword in such a way that they consist of some
slots, each of which contains or represents a particular document identifier. For
any documentDi, ‘update index’ stores these block and slot locations for the key-
words that are included in Di. More formally, suppose Di contains keyword set
denoted asWi = {wi1 , ..., wiℓ}, Ew(wij ) is the encrypted form of wij , name(Di)
is the unique filename of Di, block(wij , Di) and slot(wij , Di) denote the block
and slot order of Di’s identifier in the encryption blocks of wij . Then address list
for Di denoted as A(Di) is a set such that A(Di) = {Ew(wi1 )—— block(wij ,Di)
—— slot(wij ,Di), ..., Ew(wiℓ) —— block(wiℓ ,Di) —— slot(wiℓ ,Di)}. Finally,
{(name(D1), A(D1)), ..., (name(Dn), A(Dn))} constitutes plain ‘update index’.
Example 4.1: Consider the plain search index blocks that are depicted in
Figure 4. Encryption blocks for keyword w1 are in in the form of bit vector while
blocks for w2 and w3 are in the form of list. In this setting, address list for doc-
uments with identifiers D2, D56 and D300 are as follows: A(D2) = {Ew(w1)||1||2,
Ew(w2)||2||1},A(D56) = {Ew(w2)||1||8 } and A(D300) = {Ew(w1)||2||44,Ew(w3)||2||5}.
Fig. 4. Sample Plain Search Index Blocks
2. Document and Index Padding: Note that, address list corresponding
to document Di in plain ‘update index’ contains ℓ cells provided that Di contains
ℓ keywords. To hide the actual number of keywords included in a document, we
apply padding on the document itself or its address list prior to their encryption.
Suppose avg|w| is a parameter that indicates the unit bit length of a keyword, |Di|
is the bit length ofDi, A(Di) is the address list forDi in the plain ‘update index’.
Then Di is expected to contain ξ(Di) = ⌈|Di|/avg|w|⌉ keywords. In this setting,
if A(Di) contains less than ξ(Di) keywords, we apply padding on the address
list. Specifically, we insert |A(Di)| - ξ(Di) fake cells (e.g., Ew(fake)|| − 1|| − 1)
to A(Di). If A(Di) contains more than ξ(Di) keywords, we pad document itself
with empty spaces until ξ(Di) = ⌈|Di|/avg|w|⌉.
3. Index Encryption: Suppose {(name(D1), A(D1)), ..., (name(Dn), A(Dn))}
is a padded plain ‘update index’, ΦKD and ΨKA are pseudo-random functions
with secret keys KD and KA, OD is a random oracle. Then encrypted ‘update
index’ denoted as {(ED(D1), EA(AD1 )), ..., (ED(Dn), EA(ADn))} is generated
as follows:
– Generate ED(Di) such that ED(Di) = ΦKD (name(Di)).
– Generate a random oracle key K(Di) for the address list encryption of A(Di)
such that K(Di) = ΨKA(name(Di)).
– Suppose K(Di) is the random oracle key, A
1
Di
, ..., ArDi are members of A(Di),
OD(K(Di), j) denotes the output of random oracle OD with key K(Di) when it
is applied on input j and ⊕ represents xor operator. Then generate encryption
of A(Di) denoted as EA(A(Di)) as follows:
EA(A(Di)) = {pi
1
Di
, ..., pi
r
Di
}
pi
j
Di
= (AjDi ⊕ OD(K(Di), j), j)
Once encrypted ‘update index’ is generated, it is transferred to the cloud and
stored in the key-value store. In this setting, for any documentDi, (ED(name(Di))
is a key and EA(A(Di)) is the corresponding value. ‘Update index’ enables data
owner to delete documents from the remote servers. Deletion process is executed
as follows:
1. Deletion Token Generation: Token for deleting document with file-
name name(Di) denoted as TD(Di) is formed using secret keys KD and KA.
Specifically, suppose ΦKD and ΨKA are pseudo-random functions with keys KD
andKA. Then TD(Di) = (ED(Di),K(Di)) such that ED(Di) = ΦKD (name(Di))
and K(Di) = ΨKA(name(Di)). Once TD(Di) is formed, it is sent to the cloud
master.
2. Address Extraction: Upon reception of TD(Di) = (ED(Di), K(Di)),
master fetches the value corresponding to row-key ED(Di) from the key-value
store. Suppose {π1Di , ... ,π
r
Di
} is the value for ED(Di). Then master decrypts the
encrypted addresses as follows:
A
k
Di
= pikDi ⊕ OD(K(Di), k)
After decryption, master obtains the address set for the search index cells
which include reference to the document to be deleted. Note that, encrypted
address list contains some fake entries by the construction. These fake entries
are eliminated by the master at this phase. Final address list {A1Di , ..., A
ρ
Di
} is
utilized for adjusting the search index.
3. Search Index Update: Encrypted index blocks of the search index are
distributed among m distinct regions. To update search index, master retrieves
the necessary blocks from the region servers according to the address list {A1Di ,
..., AρDi}. Note that, each address in the list is in the form of Ew(wj) ——
block(wj ,Di) —— slot(wj ,Di). Here, Ew(wj) is the encrypted form of keyword
wj which is included in Di, block(wj , Di) and slot(wj , Di) are the block and
slot locations that holds the identifier for Di.
By the search index construction, block with location υij = block(wj ,Di)
is stored in the kth region where k = υij mod m. Specifically, it is the value
corresponding to column υij of row-key k||Ew(wj). Master retrieves this value
denoted as πwj [ρ] from the corresponding region server and applies update on it
according to its type as follows:
– Suppose πwj [ρ] is a bit-vector block. Then master updates its ι
th bit where
ι = slot(wj , id(Di)) such that πwj [ρ][ι] = πwj [ρ][ι] ⊕ 1. Note that applied xor
operation flips the bit to indicate the non-existence of keyword wj in Di. Hence,
further search results for wj will not include id(Di).
– Suppose πwj [ρ] is a list block. Then master extends the block with signal array
denoted as Swj [ρ] if there is no previous update on the block. Otherwise master
updates the existing Swj [ρ]. In this setting, signal array is an η bit vector where
η is the number of slots in a list block and each bit indicates the validity of the
corresponding slot. If a deletion request is issued for the ιth slot of the block
where ι = slot(wj , Di), ι
th bit is updated such that Swj [ρ][ι] = 1 to invalidate
this slot.
With signal array, query evaluation on the search index is slightly different.
During the search, region servers check the signal array prior the decryption of
the slots in a list block. If Swj [ρ][ι] = 1, then identifier that will be obtained
from the decryption of ιth slot is not included in the result.
4.2 Document Addition
To add a set of new documents to the encrypted collection, we propose a two-
round protocol, overview of which is depicted in Figure 5. In the first round,
data owner sends the number of slots that will be added to the search index
corresponding to a set of keywords. According to these numbers, master transfers
back the encrypted blocks with available slots. In the second round, data owner
updates received blocks or generate some new blocks if available slots are not
sufficient. Then, he forms the ‘update index’ entries for the new documents.
Finally, adjusted search index blocks and the new entries for the ‘update index’
along with the encrypted documents are sent to the cloud.
Fig. 5. Document Addition Process
During the setup, search index consists of encrypted blocks which are in
the bit-vector or list form. Since bit-vector form represents constant number
of documents, we utilize only blocks of type list during the addition process.
Although bit-vectors could be extended for addition in theory, it would be more
costly in compare to lists. This is because, list insertion will modify only small
subset of index while bit vector extension influences whole index. Hence, all
blocks that will be inserted into the search index during the addition will be in
the list form. To facilitate the addition, master server keeps an ‘addition helper
index’ as depicted in Figure 5. Note that, list blocks consist of slots, each of
which contains a document identifier. Some of these slots are invalidated during
the deletion process and they are available for further addition requests. In fact,
helper index keeps track of these available slots along with the random oracle
input counter for each encrypted keyword.
Addition Helper Index: Suppose Ew(w1), ..., Ew(wz) are the encrypted
forms of keywords w1, ..., wz, η is the number of slots in list blocks, cwi denotes
a counter for the blocks that are stored in the search index payload for Ew(wi),
δjwi is a set of block locations with j available slots. Then, value for helper index
key Ew(wi) denoted as Hwi is a pair such that Hwi = ([δ
1
wi
, ..., δηwi ], cwi).
During the search index setup, suppose nwi encryption blocks are generated for
keyword wi. Then cwi = nwi and each δ
j
wi
for 1 ≤ j ≤ η is empty. Later, if j slots
of a list block for Ew(wi) are invalidated during the deletion process, location
of this block is stored in δjwi . This indicates the availability of j slots for the
corresponding block.
Addition operation is performed in five main steps:
1. Generation of addition request: Suppose DU = {D
U
1 , ..., D
U
υ } is
a collection of new documents with contents {W (DU1 ), ..., W (D
U
υ )}, {w
u
1 , ...,
wuℓ } is a set of all keywords that are included in the new documents, id(D
U
i ) is
the identifier of DUi and ΦKt is a pseudo-random function with secret key Kt.
Then data owner generates an inverted index {(wu1 , L(w
u
1 )), ..., (w
u
υ , L(w
u
υ))}
such that id(DUj ) ∈ L(w
u
i ) if and only if w
u
i ∈ W (D
U
j ). Once inverted index
is constructed, addition request denoted as TA(DU ) is generated for the collec-
tion. Specifically, TA(DU ) = {(Ew(w
u
1 ), |L(w
u
1 )|), ..., (Ew(w
u
ℓ ), |L(w
u
ℓ )|)} where
Ew(w
u
j ) = ΦKt(w
u
j ) and |L(w
u
j )| is the number of identifiers in L(w
u
j ) respec-
tively. Finally TA(DU ) is sent to the cloud master server.
2. Block transfer: Once master receives addition request, it utilizes ‘addi-
tion helper index’ to locate blocks with available slots. If the number of slots is
not sufficient, new blocks are generated by the user which we elaborate later.
Suppose (Ew(w
u
i ), |L(w
u
i )|) is included in TA(DU ) which implies that data
owner needs |L(wui )| slots for Ew(w
u
i ) to store new document identifiers. Then,
master initially retrieves the value of Ew(w
u
i ) denoted as Hwui = ([δ
1
wui
, ..., δηwui
],
cwui ) from the ‘addition helper index’. Then starting from δ
η
wui
to δ1wui , server
extracts block locations from them until the total number of extracted slots
reaches to |L(wui )|. Note that, each block location that is extracted from δ
j
wi
contains j slots. After this traversal, if the total number of slots does not reach
to |L(wui )|, data owner will generate new blocks. Specifically, if ri more slots
are necessary, data owner will generate ⌈ri/η⌉ new blocks where η denotes the
number of slots in a single block.
Suppose {locwui (1), ..., locwui (ρi)} are the block locations that are extracted
by the helper index traversal and m is the number of regions in the distributed
search index. Then these locations are removed from the helper index and corre-
sponding blocks are retrieved from the search index. By the construction, block
with location locwu
i
(j) is stored in the kth region where k = locwu
i
(j) mod m.
Master requests encrypted block with location locwui (j) from the region server
that hosts kth region. Finally retrieved blocks for Ew(w
u
i ) denoted as ∆(w
u
i )
along with the counter in ‘addition helper index’ denoted as cwui are sent back
to the data owner.
3. Generation of new search index entries: Suppose data owner receives
block sets ∆(wu1 ), ..., ∆(w
u
ℓ ) against addition request. In this setting, ∆(w
u
i )
consists of ρi blocks, each of which contains some available slots to store new
document identifiers. In this setting, each block in ∆(wui ) is in the form of
πwui [ι] —— Swui [ι] where πwui [ι] is the ι
th encrypted block in the search index for
keyword wui and Swui [ι] is the signal array that keeps the invalid slot locations in
it. Initially, data owner decrypts each block πwu
i
[ι] to obtain plain identifier list
denoted as idι,1—— ... —— idι,η. Then identifiers in invalid slots of the blocks
are replaced with new identifiers according to Swu
i
[ι]. Specifically, suppose L(wui )
is the identifier list for the new documents that contain wui . Then, provided that
Swui [ι][υ] = 1, a random member of L(w
u
i ) is removed from it and inserted
into the υth slot of the plain block. If L(wui ) is not empty after the identifier
replacement on the retrieved blocks, data owner forms new blocks, slots of which
are filled with the remaining member of L(wui ). Finally both old and new blocks
which we call as update blocks are subject to encryption.
Suppose cwui is the block counter for wi, id
u
j,1——...—— id
u
j,η is the content of
jth plain block among the update blocks, ΨKp is a pseudo-random permutation
with key Kp and OS(K(w
u
i ), j) is the output of random oracle OS with key
K(wui ) when it is applied on input j. Then encrypted form of the block denoted
as πwu
i
[j] is generated as follows4:
K(wui ) = ΨKp(w
u
i )
piwu
i
[j] = ((iduj,1||...||id
u
j,η )⊕OS(K(w
u
i ), cwui + j), cwui + j)
After the encryption of the update blocks, their signal arrays are cleared to
zero to indicate that all slots in them are valid and new block counter for wi is
set to cwui + ni where ni is the number of update blocks for wi.
4. Generation of new update index entries: Note that, we keep ‘up-
date index’ on the search index to enable further document deletion. This index
stores the cell addresses of the search index that are connected to a particular
document. Once identifiers corresponding to new documents are placed into the
search blocks as explained in step 3, ‘update index’ entries are generated ac-
cording to these placements. More formally, suppose new document Dui contains
keyword set {wi1 , ..., wiz}, Ew(wij ) is the encrypted form of wij , block(wij , D
u
i )
and slot(wij , D
u
i ) denotes the block and slot locations that hosts the identifier
of Dui in the update blocks that are generated for wij . Then address list for
Dui denoted as A(D
u
i ) is a set such that A(D
u
i ) = {Ew(wi1 )—— block(wij ,D
u
i )
—— slot(wij ,D
u
i ), ..., Ew(wiz ) —— block(wiz ,D
u
i ) —— slot(wiz ,D
u
i )}. In this
setting, if update block is an old block that is received from the server, its loca-
tion is its previous location. Otherwise, its location is equal to the block counter
that is utilized during its encryption. Once address lists are formed for each new
document, padding and encryption is applied on them as described in Section
4.1.
5. Application of the updates: At the final stage, new entries for ‘update
index’ and ‘search index’ along with the encrypted documents are transferred
4 If authorization is enabled, each document identifier is encrypted through its group
key as described in Section 3.3.
to the cloud. Old search index blocks that are updated during the process are
placed into their previous locations as depicted in Figure 6. New search index
blocks are uniformly distributed into the regions to assign similar load to each
machine during the search process. In addition, block counter field of ‘addition
helper index’ is updated with the new block counters.
Fig. 6. Distribution of the Search Blocks
5 Security Analysis
During the execution of the scheme, we assume that Bob who manages the
cloud servers is semi-honest. As such, he follows the protocol as it is defined.
However, he may try to infer private information about the documents he hosts.
Over the years, many security definitions have been proposed for searchable
symmetric encryption for semi-honest model. Among them, simulation based
adaptive semantic security definition of [?] is the widely accepted one in the
literature. Later, it is customized to work under random oracle model in [?] to be
compatible with update operations. We adapt this definition for our construction
in such a way that we consider user access-rights and keyword payload type
while defining the legitimate information leakage. Adapted definition allows the
leakage of payload type, group-oriented access, addition, deletion and keyword
patterns.
Keyword Pattern (KWp): Suppose {o1, ..., oη} is a set of η consecutive op-
erations on the encrypted collection such that oi is a search, addition or deletion
request. Note that each operation oi has a set of associated keywords denoted
as owi . Specifically, if oi is a search instance, it involves a single keyword such
that owi = {wi1}. If oi is a deletion, it involves a set of keywords that are in-
cluded in the deleted document such that owi = {wi1 , ..., wiυ}. Finally, if oi is
an addition, it involves a set of keywords that are included in the whole corpus
of new documents such that owi = {wi1 , ... wiς}. Then KWp is a function such
that KWp((i, ρ), (j, ℓ)) = 1 if wiρ = wjℓ and KWp((i, ρ), (j, ℓ)) = 0 otherwise for
1 ≤ i, j ≤ η, 1 ≤ ρ ≤ |owi | and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ |o
w
j |.
To hide frequencies of the keywords that are included in the index in a storage
optimal way, we utilize a fixed-size list or bit-vector payloads during the search
index setup. If the number of documents that contain keyword wi is greater than
a threshold Υ , it is represented as a bit vector. Otherwise, it is represented as a
list. To capture the leakage due to the payload type, we define a payload type
pattern.
Payload Type Pattern (PTp): Suppose {o1, ..., oη} is a set of η con-
secutive operations, owi is a set of keywords that are included in operation oi.
Then PTp(i, j) = 1 if payload type for wij is bit-vector during the setup and
PTp(i, j)= 0 otherwise where 1 ≤ i ≤ η and 1 ≤ j ≤ |o
w
i |.
Group-Oriented Access Pattern (Ag
p
): Suppose oi is a search request
for keyword wx, D(wx) is the set of identifiers for the documents that contain
keyword wx, g(idj) denotes the group of document with identifier idj , block(idj)
and slot(idj) are the block and slot order in the search index payload for wx
that hosts idj . Then Ap(wx, Gι) denotes a restricted access set such that [idj ,
block(idj), slot(idj)] ∈ Ap(wx, Gι) if and only if g(idj) = Gι ∧ idj ∈ D(wx).
In this setting, suppose G(Ui) = {Gi,1, ... , Gi,f} denotes the access groups
of user Ui who issued i
th request. Then Agp(oi) = {(Ap(wx, Gi,1), Gi,1), ...,
(Ap(wx, Gi,f ), Gi,f )}.
Deletion Pattern (βp): Suppose oi is a deletion request for document
Dj which consists of keywords {wj1 , ...,wjυ}, block(wjι , Dj) and slot(wjι , Dj)
denotes the block and slot order of id(Dj) in the search index payload for
wjι and |Cj | is the bit length of Dj ’s encryption. Then L(oi) = {block(wj1 ,
Dj)——slot(wj1 , Dj), ..., block(wjυ )——slot(wjυ , Dj)} is a location set and
βp(oi) is a pair such that βp(oi) = (L(oi), |Ci|).
Addition Pattern (αp): Suppose oi is an addition request for a document
collection {Dι, ..., Dρ}, |Cx| denotes the bit-length for the encrypted form of
Dx, {wj1 , ...,wjν} is a set of keywords that are included in the new corpus and
cnt(wjι) denotes the number of documents in the new corpus that contain wjι .
Then αp(oi) = ({|Cι|, ..., |Cρ|}, {cnt(wj1), ..., cnt(wjν )}).
Security definition based on these leakages which we call authorization-aware
adaptive semantic security for dynamic searchable symmetric encryption along
with the security proof of the proposed scheme is provided in Appendix-A.
6 Experimental Analysis
In this section, we provide an empirical analysis of the proposed scheme. To
perform our evaluation, we utilized a publicly available dataset of real emails,
namely Enron dataset [?]. We selected all 30109 emails included in the sent-mail
folder of all users as our experimental corpus. Prior to index generation on the
corpus, we applied Porter stemming algorithm [?] on the e-mail contents to ex-
tract the roots of each word. After stemming and eliminating common words
like ‘the’, corpus consists of approximately 77000 keywords. We also generated a
corpus of approximately 1,200,000 emails by data replication for scalability test.
To simulate a real cloud environment, we formed a HBase cluster of twelve ma-
chines. Generated secure indices are distributed among these machines according
to the proposed architecture.
6.1 Search Evaluation
In this part, we evaluate the computationally efficiency of search scheme with
distinct settings. Storage type threshold (Υ ), dataset size (n), number of regions
for index partitioning (m), and number of user groups (|G(U)|) are the parame-
ters. Default values for these parameters are as follows: Υ = 6, n = 30109,m = 1,
|G(U)| = 1. To investigate the influence of distinct parameters, we modified a
single parameter at a time and used the default values for the others.
In this study, we propose an inverted index where payloads are in the form
of a encrypted bit vector or list during the setup. Payload type depends on a
threshold Υ which is identified according to Theorem 31. This theorem assumes
that frequencies of the keywords are distributed according to Zipfian distribution
with exponent 1. It is clear that, it does not accurately capture the frequency
distribution of the underlying dataset, but it is generally a close approximation.
In fact, our empirical analysis indicate that default Υ (i.e., Υ = 6) that is com-
puted according to Theorem 31 provides considerable storage savings in compare
to pure bit vector or list payloads as depicted in Figure 7-a.
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Fig. 7. Influence of Protocol Parameters on Search Performance
To investigate the effect of distinct parameters on the search performance,
we measured the time between the query request and identification of search
results on the HBase cluster. To do so, we generated 1000 trapdoors by randomly
drawing a keyword among all keywords. Reported timing results are the averages
for the issued trapdoors. The search time is almost linear in the number of
documents as depicted in Figure 7-b. This is because, the number of encrypted
payload blocks is proportional to the number of documents in the corpus. During
the search phase, these blocks are decrypted to identify the matching documents.
Figure 7-c demonstrates the influence of the number of regions generated on
the HBase cluster. Note that, secure index is uniformly distributed among each
region. Later, search on this distributed index is performed in parallel on each
region. Hence, increase in the number of regions decrease the unit load of each
machine.
In this study, we proposed authorization-aware keyword search protocol. Dur-
ing its execution, users are requested to issue a trapdoor component for each
group that they are involved in. Once these components are received by the
server, decryption operation is performed for each of them separately. Hence,
the necessary computations is linearly proportional to the number of groups
that a user is involved in as depicted in Figure 7-d. Note that, constructed index
payloads contain owner blocks in addition to user blocks. This enables owner
queries to be executed as if the owner is a member of a single group.
To evaluate the scalability of the proposed scheme, we replicated the emails in
our corpus 40 times. After the replication, we generated secure index on a corpus
of 1,204,360 emails which fit into approximately 2.25 GB of storage. This index
was further distributed to multiple regions in our HBase cluster. During this
construction, if pure bit vector payloads were utilized instead of the proposed
mixture of bit-vector and list payloads, the amount of necessary storage would
be approximately 11 GB. Figure 8 demonstrates the average search time for
the issued 1000 random search requests. Search operation could be performed
in milliseconds according to our analysis. Note that, increase in the number of
regions does not always reduce the search time. There is a slight increase in
search time from m = 1 to m = 3. This is due to the network latency during
the collection of partial results from the individual machines. Master needs to
gather outputs from each server where regions are hosted. On the other hand,
more regions generally decrease the total search time since each machine finishes
its job faster with less load. It is clear that proposed scheme along with the
capacity of real cloud infrastructures enables highly scalable search capability
over encrypted document collections.
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Fig. 8. Scalability Evaluation
6.2 Update Evaluation
In this part, we evaluate the computationally efficiency of the update mechanism.
To perform our evaluation, we built secure update index on our email corpus as
described in Section 4. During its construction, we apply padding on the index
payloads or document themselves to hide the actual number of keywords that
are included in the documents based on a unit keyword-length parameter de-
noted as avg|w|. Figure 9 demonstrates the influence of this parameter on the
storage. Increase in avg|w| leads to a significant reduction in the index size. This
is because, payload of the update index corresponding to document Di contains
|Ci|/avg|w| entries where Ci is the encrypted form of Di. Hence, with increas-
ing avg|w|, number of entries in the payloads become less. On the other hand,
increase in avg|w| leads to some increase in the size of the encrypted document
collection. Note that, if Di contains cnti keywords. Then |Ci|/avg|w| ≥ cnti
should hold true. If avg|w| becomes larger, we need to pad documents to satisfy
the necessary condition.
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Fig. 9. Influence of avg|w| on Storage
To evaluate the efficiency of the update operations, we measure the time
between the request and completion of modifications on the indices. Resource
consumption of both addition and deletion requests is based on the number of
keywords that are associated with the operation. Hence, we generated update
requests for documents with distinct amount of keywords. Specifically, we se-
lected 10 random emails from the corpus for each distinct keyword size (e.g., 50,
..., 250) and we issued a token for deletion and addition of the selected emails in
sequence. Reported timing results are the averages over 10 executions. Figure 10
depicts the update time for deletion and addition of a document with distinct
keyword size. With increasing number of keywords, update time for both addi-
tion and deletion increases since the number of operations both on the search
and update index are linearly proportional to the number of keywords.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a search scheme over encrypted documents for real
cloud infrastructures. Proposed design is based on a distributed secure index
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which allows parallel execution of the search process among many machines. To
restrict information leakage of the scheme according to the user access rights,
proposed approach integrates authorization into the design. In addition, we also
propose an effective update mechanism for distributed search index to be com-
patible with the dynamic nature of real storage systems. To investigate the effi-
ciency of the proposed scheme, we conduct empirical analysis on a real dataset.
Empirical evaluations indicate the practical nature of the proposed scheme.
In the context of this study, we provide a vertically partitioned index archi-
tecture to enable simultaneous decryption of large payloads by multiple machines
during the search. In future work, we plan to design a hybrid architecture that
consists of both vertically and horizontally partitioned segments to utilize re-
sources according to query workload.
A Security Definition
Prior to the security definition, we need some auxiliary notions which can be
summarized as follows:
History (Hη): Let D be the document collection and OP ={o1, ..., oη} be
the consecutive search, addition or deletion requests that are issued by users
U1, ... Uη with respective access groups G = {G(U1), ..., G(Uη)}. Then, Hη =
(D,OP,G) is defined as an η-query history.
Trace (γ): Let C = {C1, ..., Cn} be the collection of encrypted documents,
|Ci| be the size of Ci, g : D 7→ G is a function that maps the document identi-
fiers to the groups in G, KWp(Hη), PTp(Hη), A
g
p(Hη), βp(Hη), αp(Hη) be the
keyword, payload type, group-oriented access, deletion and addition patterns for
Hη, nL and nB denotes the number of keywords in the search index with list and
bit-vector payloads during the initial setup, avg|w| be the unit keyword length
parameter for the construction of update index. Then, γ(Hη) = {(|C1|, ..., |Cn|),
g, KWp(Hη), PTp(Hη), A
g
p(Hη), βp(Hη), αp(Hη) nL, nB, avg|w|} is defined as
the trace of Hη. Trace is the maximum amount of information that a data owner
allows its leakage to an adversary.
View (v): Let C = {C1, ..., Cn} be the collection of encrypted data items, I
be the secure search index, U be the secure update index and T = {To1, ..., Toη}
be the tokens for η consecutive requests in Hη. Then, v(Hη) = {C, I, U, T }
is defined as the view of Hη. View is the information that is accessible to an
adversary.
Now we can move into the security definition.
Authorization-Aware Adaptive Semantic Security for Dynamic SSE:
SSE scheme satisfies authorization-aware adaptive semantic security in random
oracle model, if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S that
can adaptively simulate the adversary’s view of the history from the trace with
probability negligibly close to 1 through interaction with random oracle. Intu-
itively, this definition implies that all the information that is accessible to the
adversary can be constructed from the trace. More formally, let Hη be a random
history from all possible histories, v(Hη) be the view, γ(Hη) be the trace of Hη.
Then, scheme satisfies the security definition in random oracle model if one can
define a simulator S such that for all polynomial size distinguishers Dist, for all
polynomials poly and a large θ:
Pr[Dist(v(Hη)) = 1]− Pr[Dist(S(γ(Hη))) = 1] <
1
poly(θ)
where probabilities are taken over Hη and the internal coins of key generation
and encryption.
Theorem A1 Proposed scheme satisfies the authorization-aware adaptive se-
mantic security.
Proof. We will show the existence of polynomial size simulator S such that
the simulated view vS(Hη) and the real view vR(Hη) of history Hη are computa-
tionally indistinguishable. Let vR(Hη) = {C, I, U , T } be the real view. Then, S
adaptively generates the simulated view vS(Hη) = {C
∗, I∗, U∗, T ∗} using trace
γ(Hη).
– S chooses n random values {C1
∗, ..., Cn
∗} such that |C1
∗| = |C1|, ..., |Cn
∗| =
|Cn|. In this setting, Ci is output of a secure encryption scheme. By the pseudo-
randomness of the applied encryption, Ci is computationally indistinguishable
from Ci
∗.
– Given the number of documents and keywords in the collection (i.e., n, nL+nB)
and identifier length (i.e., |id|), S computes the number of elements for index
payloads of type list which is represented as Υ . Then it finds the number of
blocks for list and bit-vector payload types which are denoted by cntL and cntB
respectively. Specifically, cntL is ⌈Υ/(⌊κ/|id|⌋)⌉ where κ is output length of the
random oracle OS . Similarly, cntB is ⌈n/κ⌉. In this setting, suppose ϕ is the
output length of pseudo-random function Φ, nL and nB are number of keywords
in the search index with list and bit-vector payloads. Then, nB index entries
generated for keywords with bit-vector and nL entires are formed for keywords
with list payloads. Specifically, S generates pair (k∗i , v
∗
i ) where k
∗
i is a random
value of length ϕ and v∗i is a collection of random values each of which has length
κ. The number of elements in v∗i is cntB for bit-vector and cntL for list payloads.
Finally, pairs (k∗i , v
∗
i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ (nL + nB) constitutes the simulated search
index I∗. Note that, for any real entry (ki, vi) ∈ I, there is a corresponding
simulated entry (k∗j , v
∗
j ) ∈ I
∗. Here length of ki and k
∗
j , number of blocks in vi
and v∗j along with the individual block lengths are equal. In addition, encrypted
keys and blocks are computationally indistinguishable from random values by
the pseudo-randomness of the applied encryptions.
– Given the length of ciphertexts {|C1|, ..., |Cn|} along with the unit keyword
length denoted as avg|w|, S computes the number of payload entries for each
document in the update index. Specifically, ui entries is formed for document
Di where pi = |Ci|/avg|w|. In this setting, suppose υ is the output length of
pseudorandom function that is applied on document names, ξ is the output
length of random oracle OD. Then S generates a pair (Uk
∗
i , Uv
∗
i ) for each
Ci such that Uk
∗
i is set to a random value of length υ and Uv
∗
i is set to a
collection of pi random values each of which has length ξ. Finally, pairs (Uk
∗
i ,
Uv∗i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n constitutes the simulated update index U
∗. Note that, for
real entry (Uki, Uvi) ∈ U , there is a corresponding simulated entry (Uk
∗
i , Uv
∗
i )
∈ U∗. Here length of ki and k
∗
j , number of blocks in Uvi and Uv
∗
i along with
the individual block lengths are equal. In addition, encrypted key, value pairs
are computationally indistinguishable from the random values by the pseudo-
randomness of the applied encryption.
– S simulates requests To1 , ..., Toη according to their type:
1) Toi is a search request: Suppose Toi = (πi1 , {[Gi1 , Ki1 ], ..., [Gif , Kif ]})is
a search request. Then, if KWp((i, 1), (j, ℓ)) = 1 for any 1 ≤ j < i, then
π∗i1 = π
∗
jℓ
. Otherwise π∗i is set to a random row-key kι
∗ from the simulated
search index in such a way that selected row-key was not previously selected
during the simulation. Specifically, a row-key kι
∗ is selected from I∗ with a
payload of type list if PTp(i, 1) = 1 and a payload type of bit-vector other-
wise. Here, suppose G(Ui) represents the access groups of the user who issued
the request. If KWp((i, 1), (j, 1)) = 1 and Giρ = Gjϑ where Giρ ∈ G(Ui) and
Gjϑ ∈ G(Uj) for any 1 ≤ j < i, then K
∗
iρ
= K∗jϑ . Otherwise K
∗
iρ
is set to a
random value, length of which is equal to the output length of pseudo-random
function Ψ . Note that group information that are associated with the search re-
quest is included in the group oriented access pattern (i.e., Agp). In this setting,
components of simulated and real requests are computationally indistinguish-
able by the pseudo-randomness of the applied encryption. Hence, Toi and T
∗
oi
are computationally indistinguishable. To ensure that server observes the same
data access against Toi and T
∗
oi
, S programs random oracle OS according to A
g
p.
Suppose k∗ι is row-key in I
∗ that is assigned to π∗i1 component of Toi
∗. Then,
for each Ap(wx, Giρ) that is included in A
g
p(oi), S selects blocks from v
∗
ι which
is the value corresponding to k∗ι in I
∗. Here, suppose [idj , block(idj), slot(idj)]
∈ Ap(wx, Giρ). Then S selects k
th block from v∗ι where k = block(idj) and pro-
grams OS in such a way that when the slot with order slot(idj) in this block is
decrypted with key K∗iρ , server observes idj.
2) Toi is a deletion request: Suppose Toi = (σi, Ki) is a deletion request,
βp(oi) = (Loi , |Ci|) is deletion pattern for oi, ̺ is the output length of pseudo-
random function that is used for payload encryption of the update index. Then
S selects previously unselected key-value pair (Uk∗j , Uv
∗
j ) from simulated up-
date index U∗ in such a way that number of entries in Uv∗j is ⌈|Ci|/avg|w|⌉.
Then S sets σ∗i to Uk
∗
j and K
∗
i to a random value of length ̺. To ensure that
adversary applies the correct modifications on the search index, S utilizes βp
and KWp. Suppose L(oi) = {blocki1 ||sloti1 , ..., blockiυ ||slotiυ}. Then, for each
entry blockiρ ||slotiρ in L(oi), S initially selects a row-key π
∗
iρ
from I∗. Specifi-
cally, if KWp((i, ρ), (j, ℓ)) = 1 for any 1 ≤ j < i, then π
∗
iρ
= π∗jℓ . Otherwise π
∗
iρ
is set to a random row-key from I∗ in the same way as row-key selection for
the search request. Once π∗iρ is fixed, S programs OD in such a way that, ad-
versary observes π∗iρ——blockiρ ||slotiρ when ρ
th entry of Uv∗j is decrypted with
key K∗i . Note that, adversary observes the correct addresses for the modifica-
tions on the search index once OD is programmed and it performs the necessary
modifications on the search index according to protocol flow.
3) Toi is an addition request: Suppose Toi= ((πwu1 , cnt(w
u
1 )), ..., (πwuυ ,
cnt(wuυ)) is a deletion request, αp(oi) = ({|Cι|, ..., |Cρ|}, {cnt(w
u
1 ), ...,cnt(w
u
υ)}
denotes addition pattern. Then, for each pair (πwuρ , cnt(w
u
ρ )), S simply copies
cnt(wuρ ) from Ap(oi) to form cnt(w
u
ρ )
∗. Then, if KWp((i, ρ), (j, ℓ)) = 1 for any
1 ≤ j < i, then π∗i = π
∗
jℓ
. Otherwise π∗i is set to a random row-key from the
simulated index I∗ as in the token construction for search requests. Note that
addition is a two-round process. Once adversary receives the simulated addition
request, it identifies the blocks with available slots in I∗ for each π∗wuρ according
to the protocol flow and returns them. Suppose ∆(wuρ )
∗ is the block list that
is received from the adversary for π∗wuρ . Each block in π
∗
wuρ
is in the form of
v∗j [ι]||S[ι] where v
∗
j [ι] is a column value in I
∗ and S[ι] is the corresponding
signal array which indicates the invalid slots in v∗j [ι]. In this setting, suppose
avρ is the number of invalid slots in ∆(w
u
ρ )
∗ and slotcnt is the number of slots
in each block. Then S generates |∆(wuρ )
∗| + ⌈((cnt(wuρ ) − avρ)/slotcnt)⌉ new
simulated blocks such that each block is in the form of r∗j ||S
∗
j where r
∗
j is a
random value of length |v∗j [ι]| and S
∗
j is a zero vector of length slotcnt. Finally,
these blocks are returned to adversary as simulated update blocks. During the
addition simulation, S needs to simulate new ciphertexts and update index
entries as well. Given the length of ciphertexts {|Cι|, ..., |Cρ|}, S performs the
ciphertext and update index simulation process of steps 1 and 3 respectively.
Since each component of vR(Hη) and vS(Hη) are computationally indistinguish-
able, we can conclude that the proposed scheme satisfies the security definition.
